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v.
MERRILL L. OLDROYD, GERALD CARTER,
and JOHN A. CANTO,
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Defendants and Appellants.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.
15315

-vsLLOYD WILLIAM NORMAN,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This case resulted from the filing of an information
charging defendant, Lloyd William Norman, with attempted
criminal homicide in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(b}
(1953), as amended (R.7).
or about December 25, 1976,

The information alleged that on
at Clearfield, Utah, the

defendant did, intending to cause serious bodily injury to
another, commit an act clearly dangerous to human life, in
that he shot Clifford D. Daniels.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On March 3, 1977, following a trial before
Honorable Thornley K. Swan, Judge, defendant was found
guilty of the crime of attempted manslaughter, a felony of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the third degree and was committed to the Division of
Corrections for a ninety-day evaluation (T.258, R.29).
On June 7, 1977, defendant was sentenced to the Utah
State Prison for a term of zero to five years (T.268, R.
28) •
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent prays the Supreme Court affirm
the decision of the lower court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On December 24, 1976, the defendant, Lloyd
William Norman, was living with Mrs. Lucille Daniels
:::;

at the Hammond Motel, Clearfield, Utah (T.17,66).
Daniels was the manager of the motel.
Clifford Daniels, son

Mrs.

The victim,

of Mrs. Lucille Daniels, and

his wife and children were also living at the Hammond
Motel (T.17).
At trial, the victim testified as to several
trips by his family and Mrs. Daniels and the defendant
between his apartment and the one occupied by Mrs.
Daniels and the defendant for the purposes of eating
dinner (T.24,25)
(T.26).

I

exchanging gifts (T.25), and socializing

Both the defendant and Clifford drank throughout

the evening (T.24-27).

-2-
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Clifford testified that while at his mother's
apartment later in the evening, he made several long
distance telephone calls (T.28).

Clifford was on the

kitchen phone and the defendant was on an extension in
the living room.

During the course of a conversation

with Clifford's brother, Clifford said that he could
"beat Bill arm wresting, because he was just an old
man."

(T.29, lines

6,7).

The defendant responded that

Clifford "didn't know what a Norman could do." (T.29,
line 10).

At the conclusion of the call, Clifford

testified that he returned immediately to the table
where his wife and mother were seated, while the defendant
was a few moments in returning from the living room (T.29).
Shortly thereafter Clifford's wife and mother
took his younger children home to bed.

Upon Mrs. Daniels'

return, Clifford and his oldest son, Chris, testified that
Chris asked his father if he was ready to go home(T.30).
Clifford replied that he was, but the defendant quickly
responded, "No, he's going to sit here and we're going to
drink some more."

(T.30, lines 8,9).

The defendant then

told his son, Tony, to go with Chris to Clifford's house.
Chris testified that before he and Tony left
Mrs. Daniels' home, they placed a new, unrecorded cassette
tape in a tape recorder Tony had received for Christmas,

turned on the recording mechanism, and without the knowledge
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of Clifford or the defendant placed the recorder in a
position to record any subsequent conversation between
the two (T.105-113).
Clifford then testified that after his mother
had returned, said goodnight and retired to bed, the
defendant suddenly struck the table and asked Clifford
if he was "fucking with a Norman."
Clifford responded

"No~"

(T.31, line 14).

but the defendant began to

scream and yell at him and quickly proceeded to knock
glasses, bottles and a knife from the table (T.31).

As

Clifford was rising from his chair to leave, the defendant
stood, took a gun from under his belt and shot Clifford
in the abdomen (T.31,32).

Clifford testified that he

fell back into the chair as defendant continued to curse
and threatened to kill Clifford.

Mrs. Daniels returned

to the room and the defendant commanded her to get Clifford
out of the house (T. 32) •

As Clifford rose from his chair

in an attempt to leave, he collapsed and fell to the floor
where he remained until the police arrived.
The testimony of the defendant, Lloyd William
Norman, presented a different version of the events on
December 24, 1976.
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The defendant testified that after Mrs. Daniels
had retired, Clifford began to argue with him {T.215).
Shortly after calming him down, Clifford picked up a knife
from the table, pointed it at the defendant and said
he was going to "whip" the defendant (T.215,216).
The defendant testified that he then rose from the
table, went to the bedroom where he procured a gun, tucked
it under his belt and then returned to the table where
Clifford was sitting (T.219).

Defendant, without Clifford's

knowledge, then removed the pistol from his belt, cocked it
and laid it on his lap underneath

th~table

pointing toward

Clifford (T.220).
Defendant testified that he next demanded the knife
from Clifford.

Clifford shoved it toward defendant, who

picked it up and threw it against the wall {T.22).

Defendant

testified that his hands were wet when he reached underneath
the table to uncock the hammer of the pistol.

He testified

that his fingers slipped, the gun discharged and Clifford
was struck in the abdomen by a bullet {T.221).
Following this incident, the defendant was charged
with attempted criminal homicide (R.7).

The defendant was

then tried for this offense and convicted of attempted
manslaughter

from which he now appeals {T.258, R.29).
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
UNDER UTAH STATUTORY LAW, A PERSON MAY BE
CHARGED WITH AND CONVICTED OF THE CRIME OF ATTEMPTED
MANSLAUGHTER.
The defendant, Lloyd William Norman, was
charged with the crime of attempted criminal homicide
in violation of Utah Code Ann.§ 76-5-203(b)
as amended.

(1953),

Following trial, defendant was convicted

of the crime of attempted manslaughter (T.258, R.29).
By way of this appeal defendant argues that there is
no such crime as attempted manslaughter and urges that
his conviction be reversed.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205(1) provides:
"Criminal homicide constitutes
manslaughter if the actor:
(a)
Recklessly causes the
death of another; or
(b)
Causes the death of another
under the influence of extreme mental
or emotional disturbance for which
there is a reasonable explanation or
excuse . • • • "
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103 (3) (1953), as amended, states
that one acts:
"
[r] ecklessly, or maliciously,
with respect to circumstances surrounding
his conduct or the result of his conduct
when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable
risk that the circumstances exist or thP
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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result will occur. The risk must
be of such a nature and degree that
its disregard constitutes a gross
deviation from the standard of care
that an ordinary person would exercise
under all the circW!lstances as viewed
from the actor's standpoint."
The Utah Criminal Code does not define "under the influence
of extreme mental or emotional disturbance" but case law
provides definitions of similar phrases which may be useful.
"Extreme emotional disturbance" has been defined in
People v. Shelton, 385 N.Y.S.2d 708, 717, 88 Misc.2d 136
(1976), as:
•
•
the emotional state of
an individual, who:
(a) has no mental disease or
defect • • • ; and
{b) is exposed to an extremely
unusual and overwhelming stress; and
{c) has an extreme emotional
reaction to it, as a result of which
there is a loss of self-control and
reason is overborne by intense feelings,
such as passion, anger, distress,
grief, excessive agitation, or other
similar emotions."
11

People v. Patterson, 347 N.E.2d 898, 39 N.Y.2d 288, 383 N.Y.S.2d
573 (1976), supplies a further definition.

"Extreme emotional

disturbance" results where:
11 •
•
•
a significant mental
trauma has affected a defendant's
mind for a substantial period of time,
simmering in the unknowing subconscious
and then inexplicably corning to the
fore." 347 N.E.2d at 907.
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Hence, under Utah law, a person commits manslaughter when he (1) is conscious of a risk, which if
ignored would be a substantial deviation from the standard
of care exercised by the average man, and disregards it,
resulting in the death of another person, or (2) is under
the influence of exceptionally unusual and overwhelming
stress which causes him to loose self-control, resulting
in the death of another.
The Utah Criminal Code deals with attempt at
Section 76-4-101:
"(l)
For purposes of this
part a person is guilty of an
attempt to commit a crime if, acting
with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the commission of
the offense, he engages in conduct
constituting a substantial step
toward commission of the offense.
(2)
For purposes of this part,
conduct does not constitute a substantial step unless it is strongly
corroborative of the actor's intent to
commit the offense."
A careful reading of Section 76-4-101(1) reveals that a
person has committed an attempt when (1) he acts with "the
kind of culpability otherwise required for the commission"
of the substantive offense, and (2) his conduct constitutes
"a substantial step toward commission of the offense."
Appellant contends that there is no such crime
as attempted manslaughter.

He argues that the term
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;

.

"culpability," as used in the attempt statute, means
the ~ ~ inherent to the substantive criminal
offense (Appellant's Brief, page 4).

He states that

culpability does not refer to reckless actions or
actions which are the result of "extreme mental or
emotional disturbance" and concludes that since there
is no mens rea associated with the crime of manslaughter,
there can be no crime of attempted manslaughter
(Appellant's Brief, page 5).
Respondent excepts to appellant's reasoning
and conclusion and asserts that, undeE Utah statutory
law, a person may be charged with and convicted of the
crime of attempted manslaughter.
The function of the law of criminal attempt
is to permit courts to adjust penalties in cases where
the conduct of the defendant falls short of the conduct
required to constitute a completed offense.

State v.

Wilson, 218 Or. 575, 364 P.2d 115 (1959). Criminal
attempt laws allow a court to adjust penalties in light
of specific facts and circumstances to more accurately
reflect the criminal responsibility and guilt of the
defendant.

Professor Arnold offers this analysis:
"Suppose we say that the
law of criminal attempts is not
a classified set of rules describing
the elements of any crime or covering
any given conduct. When we talk about
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the law of criminal attempts in
general suppose we refer to it as
a power or discretion that has
been given to the courts either
by the legislature or by common
law precedent to extend the limits
of prohibitions against certain
kinds of conduct to conduct which
does not quite fall within the terms
of those prohibitions. We immediately
recognize that this power is very
similar to the power which courts
have given themselves in that vague
field known as common law crimes.
This is a most useful logical
device and, while it may seem
vague, no one considers it confused.
For example, suppose that a careless
legislature omits the penalty in a
criminal statute. The device of
common law crimes provides a way out
of the dilemma. A sketchy criminal
code omits to prohibit an obviously
dangerous kind of conduct. The
power to punish for common law crimes
gives the court freedom to act without
appearing to encroach upon the legislature. We are content to define this
power in terms which are broad enough
to cover any case which might arise.
The vagueness of our definition,
however, does not bother us because
we do not regard the law against
common law crimes as a law which
must be enforced, such as the prohibition law or the law against
murder.
Instead, we regard it as a
useful device under which courts are
free to fill up omissions in criminal
codes.
The law of criminal attempts is
exactly the same kind of a thing.
Considered apart from any particular
crime it simply means that courts are
permitted to fill in the gaps which a
set of definitions inevitably leave
when applied to human conduct. The
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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power to interpret statutes
performs a similar function, but
the rules of statutory interpretation of criminal statutes are
never considered as definitions
of crimes. The power to punish for
criminal attempts gives the court
power to extend a criminal statute
without distorting its language.
It is necessary to our criminal
system. To treat this power as
the definition of a substantive
crime is either to destroy it or
hopelessly to confuse it."
Arnold, Criminal Attempts--The
Rise and Fall of an Abstraction,
40 Yale Law Journal 53, 74, 75
(1931).
(Emphasis added.)
This general statement of the policy and philosophy
of the law of criminal attempt has
Legislature.

be~n

codified by the Utah

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (1)

(1953), as amended,

provides:
"If the court, having regard to
the nature and circumstances of the
offense of which the defendant was
found guilty and to the history and
character of the defendant, concludes
that it would be unduly harsh to
record the conviction as being for that
category of offense established by
statute and to sentence the defendant
to an alternative normally applicable
to that offense, the court may enter
a judgment of conviction for the
next lower category of offense and
impose sentence accordingly."
Thus, the law of criminal attempt is a flexible law
provided to aid a court in more fairly and equitably
arriving at a punishment which correctly reflects the
guilt of the defendant.

Courts should be allowed broad
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discretion in its application, taking into consideration
all facts and circumstances surrounding the defendant's
criminal acts.
Again, the Code provides that a person is
guilty of an attempt when (1) he acts with "the kind of
culpability otherwise required" for the commission of the
substantive offense, and (2) his conduct constitutes a
"substantial step toward commission of the offense."
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (1953), as amended.

The Criminal

Code defines "culpable mental state" in Utah Code Ann, §
76-2-102 (1953), as amended:
"Every offense not involving
strict liability shall require a
culpable mental state, and when
the definition of the offense does
not specify a culpable mental state,
intent, knowledge, or recklessness
shall suffice to establish criminal
responsibility." (Emphasis added.)
Section 76-2-102 states that recklessness will
supply the criminal responsibilityorculpability when the
offense does not involve strict liability and the statutory
definition of the crime does provide a culpable mental
state.

Section 76-5-205(1), the code definition of man-

slaughter, does not set forth a culpable mental state.
Therefore, Section 76-2-102 applies and provides that
"recklessness" will establish the culpable mental state.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Once "recklessness" has been adopted as the culpable
mental state of manslaughter, the crime of attempted
manslaughter is then possible.
Both requirements of the attempt statute,
when applied to the crime of manslaughter--a culpable
mental state and a substantial step toward commission
of the offense--are fulfilled in the instant case.
The defendant testified that he obtained a pistol from
the bedroom, placed it on his lap underneath the table
aimed in Clifford's direction and cocked it, all without
Clifford's knowledge (T.219,220).

The defendant further

testified that he was not in fear of his life or frightened
by Clifford (T.229).

As defendant later attempted to

uncock the pistol, the hammer slipped from his wet fingers,
the pistol discharged and the bullet struck clifford in
the abdomen (T.221).

The defendant's actions in secretly

aiming a loaded pistol, hammer cocked and cartridge in
the chamber, at the victim during the course of a heated
conversation after an evening of heavy drinking constituted
recklessness in that it was conduct which disregarded the
standard of care exercisable by an ordinary person.

An

ordinary person, neither fearful nor frightened, would
not aim a loaded pistol at another in such an awkward
and clumsy manner.

Thus, the first element of the crime
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of attempted manslaughter, recklessness under circumstances
which could result in the death of another, is fulfilled.
The second element of attempted manslaughter,
an act which constitutes a substantial step toward the
death of another, was fulfilled as the defendant attempted,
while his hands were wet, to release the hammer of a
loaded and cocked pistol held in an awkward position.
Trying to release the hammer of a loaded pistol in such a
clumsy manner is a substantial step toward the commission
of manslaughter when coupled with recklessness.
Therefore, both elements of the attempt statute
having been complied

with~

the defendant's actions under

the stated circumstances amount to the crime of attempted
manslaughter.
POINT II

BECAUSE OF DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION FOR ATTEMPTED
MANSLAUGHTER HE NEED NOT BE RETRIED ON THE ORIGINAL CHARGES.
The defendant was convicted of attempted manslaugri!
a criminal offense under Utah law as defined by Utah Code
Ann. § 76-4-101 (1)

(1953), as amended.

There is, therefore,,

no reason or need for the defendant to be retried for the
original offense.
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POINT III
THE EVIDENCE PRODUCED AT TRIAL WAS SUFFICIENT
TO SUSTAIN THE VERDICT RENDERED BY THE TRIAL COURT.
Defendant argues that if this Court sustains
his conviction for attempted manslaughter, he is nonetheless entitled to reversal and release in that the
evidence produced at trial was insufficient to sustain
the verdict.
Respondent contends that even when the evidence
is viewed in a light most favorable to the defendant, it
is sufficient to sustain a conviction of attempted
manslaughter.

This Court has consistently maintained

that on appeal it will not "weigh the evidence nor say
what quantum is necessary to establish a fact beyond a
reasonable doubt so long as the evidence given is
substantial."
1976).

State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216, 218 (Utah

On appeal, the evidence will be examined in "the

light most favorable to the verdict."

State v. Canfield,

18 Utah 2d 292, 422 P.2d 196, 199 (1967}.

See also

State v. Coffey, 564 P.2d 777 (Utah 1977}; State v.
Berchtold, 357 P.2d 183, 11 Utah 2d 208 (1960}.
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable
to the verdict, it is clear that the evidence taken at
trial was sufficient to support the verdict of guilty of

-15-
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attempted manslaughter.

Appellant testified that he

and Clifford sat at the kitchen table while Clifford held
a knife and challenged him (T.214,215).

The defendant

then left the table to procure a gun from the bedroom,
whereupon he returned but hid the gun under his belt
(T.216,217).

Once he was seated, the defendant secretly

took the gun from under his belt, cocked the hammer and
placed the gun on his lap aimed in the victim's direction
(T.219,220).

Defendant then asked Clifford for the knife

whereupon Clifford provided him with the same which he
promptly picked up and threw against the wall (T.220).
While his hands were wet, the defendant tried to uncock
the gun but the hammer slipped from his fingers, the gun
discharged and the bullet struck Clifford in the abdomen
(T.220-222).
It is apparent that this, the defendant's
version of the facts, clearly supports the conviction
of attempted manslaughter.

The defendant's actions in

secretly aiming a loaded pistol, hammer cocked and cartridge
in the chamber, at the victim during the course of a heated
conversation after an evening of heavy drinking constituted
recklessness which could result in the death of another.
The defendant's further action of attempting to release
the hammer of a loaded and cocked pistol while his hands
.
.
. 1
were wet and slippery
constituted
a substantia
s t ep toward
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the death of another.

Thus, the evidence produced at

trial was of a weight sufficient to support a verdict
of guilty of attempted manslaughter.
CONCLUSION
Respondent asserts that defendant was properly
convicted of the crime of attempted manslaughter.
Code Ann. § 76-4-101(1)

Utah

(1953), as amended, provides that

a person is guilty of attempt when (1) he acts with "the
kind of culpability otherwise required for the commission"
of the substantive offense, and (2) his conduct constitutes
"a substantial step toward commission of the offense."
In the case of manslaughter, the culpable state of mind
is "recklessness."
amended.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 (1953), as

Thus, where the defendant's actions are reckless

under circumstances which could result in the death of another
and he further acts in a manner which constitutes a substantial
step toward the death of another, the defendant is guilty of
attempted manslaughter.
Respondent further contends that the evidence
produced at trial was sufficient to support and fulfill each
element of the crime.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
WILLIAM W. BARRETT
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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